Mitigation of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Multi-Area Automatic Generation Control by Alhalali, Safoan et al.
1
Mitigation of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Multi-Area
Automatic Generation Control
Safoan Alhalali∗, Student Member, IEEE, Christopher Nielsen†, Member, IEEE, Ramadan El–Shatshat†, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—In recent years, several cyber-attacks have been
recorded against sensitive monitoring systems. Among them is
the automatic generation control (AGC) system, a fundamental
control system used in all power networks. AGC systems keep
the network frequency at its desired value and maintain the
tie-line power exchanges at their scheduled values. Motivated
by the increasing need for robust and safe operation of AGCs,
we introduce an attack resilient control scheme for the AGC
system based on attack detection using state estimation. The
proposed approach requires redundancy of sensors available at
the transmission level in the power network and leverages recent
results on attack detection using mixed integer linear program-
ming (MILP). The proposed algorithm detects and identifies the
sensors under attack in the presence of noise. The non-attacked
sensors are then averaged and made available to the feedback
controller. No assumptions about the nature of the attack signal
are made. The proposed method is simulated using a large range
of attack signals and uncertain sensors measurements.
Index Terms—Power system network, automatic generation
control, cyber security
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several cyber-attack incidents have been
reported [1]. A detailed survey of different cyber-attack in-
cidents was provided in [2]. Different strategies have been
proposed in [3], [4] for a class of the actuator attacks. A de-
tailed elaboration on cyber-attack incidents in power networks
appears in [5], [6]. Little work has been conducted with respect
to attack resilient measures that are used to detect, identify,
and mitigate corrupted real-time measurements in the feedback
loop of automatic generation control (AGC).
The accuracy and reliability of real-time measurements has
a significant impact on system’s real-time operation. In smart
power grids, real-time measurements for AGC are transmitted
using computer networks [7]. These computer networks might
be an attractive space for cyber-attackers, e.g., disgruntled
employees, insiders, nation states or terrorist organizations [8].
Through the computer network, the attacker can also learn the
parameters of the system using the algorithm shown in [7].
The compromised measurements may lead to very severe
and adverse effects on the management and control of a
smart grid. For example, the corrupted measurements can
cause a rapid decline in the system frequency that leads to
trigger load shedding schemes or generators disconnecting.
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This is because the compromised measurements can mislead
the AGC, which requires minimal supervision and intervention
by human operators, to increase generation through a false
impression of increasing demand. The imbalance between
power generation and demand leads to deviation of the grid
frequency from its nominal value. The channels through which
the attacker can corrupt sensor measurements include the phys-
ical sensors, sensor data communication links, and data pro-
cessing programs at the control center. Accessing and attacking
geographically distributed physical sensors is tedious and hard
to coordinate. However, hacking a computer program at the
strongly protected control center is not impossible [1], [2].
A. Related Works
The work in [7] assumes that the frequency sensor is well
protected and builds their detection model based on a com-
parison between the prediction of frequency and the measured
one. Therefore, in case of losing the frequency measurement
the detection algorithm will be no longer functioning, leaving
great chance for the attacker to manipulate the system.
Many of the proposed detection and identification algo-
rithms for security of AGCs [2], [8], [9], [10] use limited
attack templates that cannot characterize real-world attackers
well. In [8] the author proposed a statistical method based on
maximizing the likelihood of detecting the attacked sensor.
However, many of the statistical methods [11], [12], [13],
including [8], have the problem of false positives and false
negatives. The work of [8] has reported 5% false positives
and false negatives. The proposed mitigation strategy in [7],
[8] is, upon detecting an attack, to replace the sensor data with
forecasting data. Such a strategy can cause large deviation
from the nominal frequency due to forecasting error.
The work in [7] identifies the sensors under attack after 20
seconds from the onset of the attack. The mitigation algorithm
proposed in [7] is based on neglecting the measurements
from the sensors under attack. Therefore, the attacker can
manipulate the AGC system during the 20 second period,
causing at least some profit losses to the owner or even
triggering the remedial action. The work in [14], [15] have
formulated the state estimation problem using mixed integer
linear programming (MILP). However, the authors assume
that the system is noiseless. No mitigation solution has been
proposed in [14], [15], [16], [17].
B. Contributions of this Work
In this paper we developed a new attack resilient scheme for
single and multi-area AGC systems. The proposed approach
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of a single AGC system (G) with the proposed attack
detection and mitigation scheme. Dashed lines indicate discrete-time signals,
solid lines represent continuous-time signals while thick lines indicate multi-
sensor channels.
detects and identifies the sensors under attack on single area
AGC systems leveraging the results presented in [15] and [17].
Once an attack has been identified, we employ a simple
switching scheme to ensure that the AGC feedback loop con-
tinues to make its control decisions using uncompromised sen-
sor data. We also characterize the degree of sensor redundancy
needed in order to implement a robust solution and ensure
uninterrupted service. We extend the above ideas to a multi-
area AGC framework where the frequency and tie-line sensors
may be attacked. We provide s-sparse observability analysis
for AGC in single area and multi-area power networks. We
provide numerical simulations demonstrating the effectiveness
of the proposed approach in detecting and mitigating attacks
as well as the feasibility of real-time implementation.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of our proposed attack
detection and mitigation scheme in the context of a single
AGC system. The key idea is to have redundant sensors to
measure the generator’s (G’s) frequency y(t) so that, when
an attack signal e[k] corrupts the measurement, we correctly
identify the un-attacked sensors and use this data in yFB[k] to
decide on the control signal u[k]. The signal w[k] represents
the measurement noise. The block C[z] represent the controller
while the blocks D/A and A/D are respectively represent the
digital to analog converter and analog to digital converter.
We augment the conventional AGC system by adding
more frequency sensors and model the attack vector to the
measurement equation in Section II. The proposed detection
and identification algorithm is presented in Section III. In
Section IV we explain how the un-compromised sensors are
fused in order to generate a reliable control signal. We extend
these ideas to multi-area AGC systems in Section V while
Section VI provides numerical simulation results.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR A SINGLE AGC
We present a standard continuous-time state-space represen-
tation of the linearised model of a single area AGC system.
We use the conventional control architecture based on the
linearised model. The state-space variable x1 := ∆Pv equals
the steam valve position command; the variable x2 equals
∆Pm, the change in mechanical power; the state x3 equals
the frequency change ∆ω of the power system network. The
state vector of the AGC system is x := (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3. The
exogenous signals are the control input u(t) which physically
represents the generation difference and the disturbance d(t)
which physically represents load change ∆PL(t). With these
definitions the linearised AGC dynamics can be expressed in
state-space form as
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Ed(t). (1)
Following [18], the matrices in (1) are given by
A =
−1/τg 0 01/τT −1/τT 0
0 1/2H −D/2H








. The meaning of the physical
parameters appearing in these matrices can be found in [18].
The signal available for feedback is x3(t) which is also the
variable that must be regulated. Therefore, the system output
is taken to be




x(t) + w(t) (3)
where w ∈ R represents measurement noise and is assumed
to take values in a known compact subset of the output space
R. In other words, there exists a known constant δw > 0 such
that for all t ≥ 0, |w(t)| ≤ δw.
In practice, the controller is often designed for the
continuous-time dynamics (1), (3) and then descretized for
implementation. Assuming an ideal sample and an ideal zero-
order hold at a sampling period of T > 0 seconds, and further
assuming that d(t) = ∆PL(t), and w(t) are constant over a
sampling period, the AGC evolves in discrete time according
to the dynamics,
x[k + 1] = Adx[k] +Bdu[k] + Edd[k]
y[k] = Cdx[k] + w[k]
(4)
where x[k] := x(kT ) is the value of the state at time
kT , k ∈ Z. Similarly y[k] := y(kT ) , d[k] := d(kT ),




eAτB dτ , Ed =
∫ T
0
eAτE dτ and Cd = C.
We assume that the sampling is not pathological so that the
pairs (Ad, Bd), (Cd, Ad) remain, respectively, controllable and
observable. A commonly used control law is proportional-
integral (PI) control [18] given, in discrete-time, by
xc[k + 1] = xc[k] + Ty[k]
u[k] = KP y[k] +KIxc[k]
(5)
where xc[k] is the controller state at time kT and KP , KI
are, respectively, the proportional and integral gains. During
normal operation, thanks to the integral action in the controller,
the single area AGC system is able to reject piecewise constant
disturbances while keeping the system frequency at its nominal
value.
A. Sensor redundancy and attack model
As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper we assume
that the AGC is equipped with more than one frequency sensor.
This redundancy will be used to detect cyber-physical attacks
3
and take appropriate control action. As such, we no longer
assume that the measured output is 1-dimensional as in (4),
but rather that there are p frequency sensors. Let y ∈ Rp
denote the information available for feedback using redundant
sensors. As in the single output case (4), each sensor is
assumed to be corrupted by measurement noise which, with
mild abuse of notation, we denote as a vector w ∈ Rp. We
continue to assume that there is a known constant δw > 0
such that1 for all k ∈ Z, ‖w[k]‖∞ ≤ δw. To model a cyber-
physical attack, we let e ∈ Rp denote an attack vector so
that e[k] represents an attack on the sensors at time t = kT .
This attack vector appears as an additive disturbance to the
measured variables so that the AGC model, with redundant
measurements and attacks, is given by
x[k + 1] = Adx[k] +Bdu[k] + Edd[k]
y[k] = Cx[k] + w[k] + e[k]
(6)
where C := (1p⊗Cd), ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and
1p ∈ Rp is the vector of all ones. The first problem considered
in this paper, under the assumption that we have sufficient
redundancy in the sensors, is to identify which sensors have
been corrupted by an attack and then use the non-attacked
measurements as inputs to the control law (5) in order to
ensure reliable operation of the AGC. In Section V we extend
this idea to multi-area automatic generation control.
III. ATTACK DETECTION
As stated in the introduction, we leverage the results in [15]
and [17] to detect attacks on AGC systems. In this section,
we summarize how the attack detection scheme works in the
context of an AGC. We start by determining the maximum
number of sensors that can be simultaneously attacked while
still retaining the ability to detect the attacks when there is no
noise and no load change. To do this we need some notation.
If Np := {1, . . . , p} and K ⊆ Np, then Kc := Np\K denotes
the complement of K in Np. Let PK : Rp → R|K| be the linear
map which takes a vector y ∈ Rp and removes the rows in
Kc.
Definition III.1 ([19]). A pair (C, A) is s-sparse observable
if, for every set K ⊂ Np of cardinality s, the pair (PKcC, A)
is observable.
We assume that the number of compromised sensors in (6)
is less than or equal to qmax, the maximum number of sensors
for which the system’s state can be recovered when there is
no noise and no load changes.
Lemma III.2 ([15]). The maximum number qmax of attacked
sensors for which the state of (6) can be recovered when there
is no noise and no disturbance equals the largest s ∈ Np for
which the pair (C, Ad) is 2s-sparse observable.
From this lemma we can immediately quantify the minimum
degree of redundancy needed for frequency control of an AGC.
Proposition III.3. The maximum number of sensors which can
be attacked while retaining the ability to estimate the state of
1If x ∈ Rn, then ‖x‖∞ = max {|x1|, . . . , |xn|}.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF FREQUENCY SENSORS p AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
ATTACKED SENSORS qmax .
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
qmax 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
the single AGC system when there is no noise and no load
changes equals b(p− 1)/2c.
Proof. Observe that the pair (C,Ad) is observable. Therefore
the pair (PKcC, Ad) is observable as long as PKc is not equal
to the zero map, i.e., Kc 6= ∅. This in turn implies that |K| ≤
p − 1. Setting 2qmax = |K| and solving for qmax gives the
desired result.
Table I gives an interpretation of Proposition III.3. Given
an expected maximal number of sensors qmax that can be
attacked, we can choose the number of frequency sensors that
the AGC should be equipped with.
Remark III.4. The criteria for selecting the degree of sensor
redundancy, from point of view of the operator, is based on
a careful cost benefit analysis. Given the huge impact, both
socially and economically, of an attack, having a large number
of sensors may be justifiable. The full economic analysis of
such decision is outside the scope of this paper and merits
further research.
Remark III.5. A conventional AGC system can be attacked
by a small team of attackers. The proposed control scheme
introduces more obstacles to the attackers. By requiring that
multiple sensors to be compromised simultaneously, the pro-
posed scheme requires a larger, more well-funded and skilled
team to overcome the defense.
A. Identifying attacked sensors
The support of the attack vector e at time k is supp (e[k]) =
{i ∈ Np : ei[k] 6= 0}, where ei is the ith component of e. The
symbol ‖e[k]‖0 = | supp (e[k])| denotes the number of non-
zero entries in the vector e[k]. Let K :=
⋃
k∈Z supp (e[k]) and,
in light of Proposition III.3, we assume throughout that2 |K| ≤
qmax = b(p − 1)/2c. To identify the sensors that have been
attacked we collect the last N output measurements and solve
an MILP at every time step. The value used for N is naturally
taken to be equal to the dimension of the system’s state space.
Let ỹi[k] :=
[
Piỹ[k −N + 1]> · · · Piỹ[k]>
]> ∈ RN be
the vector which maintains the last N sensor measurements
from sensor i ∈ Np, compensated for the inputs applied during
this interval, i.e,




CAjdBdu[n− j − 1],
where n ∈ {k −N + 2, . . . , k} . De-
fine, for output i ∈ Np, Oi :=
2This assumption can be weakened to state that, over any time interval of





> · · · (PiCAN−1)>
]> ∈
RN×n and let ei[k] :=
[
ei[k −N + 1]> · · · ei[k]>
]> ∈
RN . The vector ei represents the attack values injected
into sensor i over the last N time steps. Similarly, define
wi[k] :=
[
wi[k −N + 1]> · · · wi[k]>
]> ∈ RN as the list
of measurement noise over the last N time steps at sensor i.
Then we can express the last N measurements obtained from
output i ∈ Np as
ỹi[k] = Oix[k −N ] + ei[k] + wi[k]. (7)
Following [20], in this expression we have absorbed the effect
of the disturbance d into the measurement noise terms and
therefore, if necessary, increasing δw so that ‖w[k]‖∞ ≤
δw continues to hold. Since the open-loop matrix (2) is
Hurwitz, this approach is not overly conservative. Next
we stack each of vectors, corresponding to each output,
in (7) to define Y[k] :=
[
ỹ1[k]









> · · ·wp[k]>
]>
.
Each of these are pN -dimensional real vectors. Finally, define
O :=
[
O>1 · · · O>p
]> ∈ RpN×n so we can compactly write
Y[k] = Ox[k −N ] + E[k] + W[k]. (8)
By assumption, the measurement noise is uniformly bounded
‖w[k]‖∞ ≤ δw and so the vector W[k] is restricted to the
compact ‘box’ Ω := [−δw, δw]pN ⊂ RpN .










where I(·) denotes the indicator function. The number
‖E[k]‖2,0 equals the number of sensors that have been at-
tacked over the last N time steps while ‖E[k]‖2,1 represents






subject to: Y[k]−Ox[k −N ] + E[k] = W[k]
W ∈ Ω.
M
In the absence of noise, i.e., when Ω = 0 ∈ RpN , if
the number of attacked sensors |K| is less than or equal
to qmax = b(p − 1)/2c, then the values of the minimizing
decision variables for Problem 1 are the state x[k − N ] and
the actual attack vector E∗[k] [15]. In the presence of noise,
the minimizing variables aren’t necessarily (x[k−N ],E∗[k]).
Problem 1 involves combinatorial optimization and can be
solved using MILP solvers. However, solving this problem is
NP–hard in the general case which limits its use to smaller
size systems. We will see that, since our AGC system with
n = 3 state, N = 3 time steps and p = 3 frequency sensors,
solving Problem 1 is feasible in real-time applications. Another






subject to: Y[k]−Ox[k −N ]−E[k] = W[k]
W ∈ Ω.
M
This problem can be solved efficiently but is only effective
at detecting relatively large attacks.
B. Performance
In [17], the authors provide a bound on the error between
the true value of x[k−N ] and its estimated value for both of
the aforementioned optimization problems. Let (x̃2,0, Ẽ2,0) be
the minimizing values for the decision variables for Problem 1
and let (x̃2,1, Ẽ2,1) be the minimizing values for the decision
variables for Problem 2. Let E∗ denote the true attack vector
over the last N time steps. Define the errors for Problem 1
∆x2,0 := x̃2,0 − x[k − N ], ∆E2,0 := Ẽ2,0 − E∗ as well as
the errors ∆x2,1 := x̃2,1 − x[k − N ], ∆E2,1 := Ẽ2,1 − E∗
the errors for Problem 2. By first computing an error bound
on ∆x2,0 and ∆x2,1, one can prove the existence of constants
Dij , i ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ Np such that if
I
(
‖ẽj [k]‖ > Dij
)
, (10)
where ẽj [k] is the jth block vector in either Ẽ2,0 (when i = 0)
or Ẽ2,1 (when i = 1), then sensor j has been attacked over
the last N time steps. In this paper we use the integer decision
variable E in Problem 1 as our estimate of which sensors were
attacked over the last N time steps. In other words, we will
say that sensor j has been attacked over the last N times steps
if
I(‖ẽj [k]‖2 > 0) (11)
While there is no guarantee that the policy (11) will cor-
rectly detect the attacked sensor, simulations suggest that
this approach is able to identify sensors under attack even
when the attacks are small in magnitude. In the case where,
due to computational efficiency considerations, one instead
solves Problem 2, the policy (10) (using D1j ) guarantees no
false positive attack detections if the sufficient condition [17,
Eqn. (29)]] is satisfied. Unfortunately, it can be shown using
the parameters in Table II that the single AGC system does
not satisfy the aforementioned sufficient condition. Therefore,
the policy (10) is neither reliable nor effective for small
magnitude of attack3. Since the bound computed in [17] is
very conservative, due to several applications of the triangular
inequality in its derivation, a huge range of small magnitude
of attacks elude the proposed attack detector.
3Based on the parameters of the single AGC system shown in Table II
Dẽ
l0





AGC PARAMETERS IN SINGLE AREA SYSTEM [8]
D R KI H(s) τg(s) τT (s)
0.8 0.05 7 5 0.2 0.5
IV. ATTACK MITIGATION
At each time step k, the proposed attack mitigation strategy
for a single AGC system with p ≥ 3 frequency sensors is the
as follows.
1) Fix N ≥ 3 to be the number of steps over which we
aim to detect attacks. The lower bound of 3 comes from
the dimension of the AGC’s state-space.
2) If k ≥ N − 1, solve the mixed integer linear program
Problem 1. Let Ẽ2,0[k] denote the value of the decision




I(‖ẽ1[k]‖2 > 0) . . . I(‖ẽp[k]‖2 > 0)
]>
where ẽj [k] is the jth block vector in Ẽ2,0[k]. The ith
component of s[k] is 1 if we have not detected an attack
on sensor i over the last N time steps. Otherwise the
ith component equals zero.
4) Take the average of the un-attacked sensor readings as





5) Update the discretized PI control signal
xc[k + 1] = xc[k] + TyFB[k]
u[k] = KP yFB[k] +KIxc[k]
(13)
and return to Step 2 at the next sample instant.
V. EXTENSION TO MULTI-AREA AGC SYSTEMS
Conventional multi-area AGC is based upon tie-line bias
control where each area tends to reduce the area control error
(ACE) to zero [18].
Consider a power network with n areas represented as a set of
vertices Nn = {1, . . . , n} and overhead or underground lines
(tie- lines) represented by a set of edges E ⊆ V×V. The neigh-
bours of area i are defined as Ni := {j ∈ Nn : (i, j) ∈ E}. The
neighbours of area i are simply the areas connected to it via
tie-lines. If (i, j) ∈ E, then ∆Pij represents a deviation from
the scheduled exchanges between areas i and j. The variable
∆ωi represents the deviation from the nominal frequency
value for area i. With this notation, the area control error for
area i consists of a linear combination of frequency and its
neighbouring tie-line error ACEi := βi∆ωi +
∑
j∈Ni ∆Pij .
The area bias βi determines the amount of interaction dur-
ing a disturbance in the neighbouring areas. To model the
interconnection with its neighbours, we modify the single
AGC continuous-time model (1) as follows. For simplicity
assume that all the AGCs have the same physical constants.
Let ri := |Ni| and ni := 3 + ri. The three comes from the
original state variables in (1) and the |Ni| extra states come
from the interconnections. The model of AGC i in the multi-
area AGC setup is then given by
ẋi(t) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t) + Eidi(t) (14)
with Ai ∈ Rni×ni , Bi ∈ Rni , Ei ∈ Rni×(1+ri). Specifically,
letting Ni := e31>ri ∈ R
























where A, B, E are the same matrices as in the single
AGC system (1). The constant Ps is the synchronizing power
coefficient, and equals the slope of the power angle curve at
the initial operating angle. The first three state variables are
the same as before while the last ri = |Ni| state variables
are ∆Pij , i.e., the deviation from the scheduled exchanges
between areas i and j where j ∈ Ni. The control signal ui(t)
is the same as in the single AGC model and the disturbance
vector di(t) = (∆PL(t),∆ωj1(t), . . . ,∆ωjri (t)) is the load
change on AGC i followed by the frequency change of each
of the AGC’s neighbours.
In the conventional setup, AGC i has access to its own
frequency measurement ∆ωi as well as ∆Pij for each j ∈ Ni.
Therefore the information available for feedback is given by








Once again the measurement noise wi(t) is assumed to be
bounded in a known compact set. The conventional control





βi 1 · · · 1
]
yi(τ)dτ where yi,1 is the first com-
ponent of yi, i.e., AGC i’s own frequency measurement.
The scalers KP,i, KI,i are, respectively, the proportional and
integral gains of AGC i. Satisfactory performance is achieved
by setting βi = KP,i +Di [18]
A. Proposed Attack-resilient State Estimation for the Multi
Areas AGC System
Descretize the continuous time model (14), (16) of AGC i
in the same manner as (6). The attack vector appears as an
additive disturbance to the measured variables so that the AGC
i model with redundant measurements and attacks is given by
xi[k + 1] = Aidxi[k] +Bidui[k] + Eiddi[k]




1p1 ⊗ Ci,1 1p2 ⊗ Ci,2 ·· 1pri+1 ⊗ Ci,ri+1
]
The first p1 rows in Ci represent the redundant frequency
measurements, and 1pj+1 ⊗ Ci,j+1 , where j ∈ {1, ··, ri},
represent jth tie-line redundant measurements. Once again
the sampling is assumed to be non-pathological. We make the
mild assumption that all interconnected AGCs are sampled at
the same rate T > 0 and that all sample and hold operators
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in the network are synchronised. The discretized PI controller
for AGC i in state-space form is
xc,i[k + 1] = xc,i[k] + Tyi[k]
ui[k] = KP,iyi,1[k] +KI,i
[




The first issue considered in this section, under the assumption
that we have sufficient redundancy in the sensors, is to identify
which sensors have been corrupted by an attack and then
use the non-attacked measurements as inputs to the control
law (19). To understand how many attacks can be tolerated,
we need to understand the s-sparse observability of (14), (16).
Proposition V.1. The pair (PKCi, Ai), where Ai is given
in (15), Ci is given by (17) and K ⊆ Nri+1, is observable
if, and only if
(i) K 6= ∅, and
(ii) |K ∩ {2, . . . , ri + 1}| ≥ ri − 1.
The conditions of this proposition can be intuitively inter-
preted as saying that AGC i is observable so long as it’s only
missing information from at most one of its neighbours.
Proof. We start by understanding the structure of the unob-
servable subspace of the pair (Ci, Ai). To simplify notation
let cj denote the jth row of Ci. Then Ker c1 ⊆ Ker cjAi for
j ≥ 2. This can be shown by noting that cjAi = c1. It follows
that Ker(c1Ak−1i ) ⊆ Ker(cjAki ) for k ≥ 1, 2 ≤ j ≤ ri + 1.
Therefore the unobservable subspace of the pair (Ci, Ai) can















= KerCi ∩Ker (c1Ai) ∩ · · · ∩Ker (c1Ani−1i )
where we have used Ker(c1Ak−1i ) ⊆ Ker(cjAki ) for k ≥ 1
and 2 ≤ j ≤ ri+1 to obtain the last equality. We can re-write





where N(c1,Ai) is the unobservable subspace of (c1, Ai). We
claim that the dimension of N(c1,Ai) equals ni − 4 = ri − 1.
To show this, compute the first 5 rows of the observability





cA2 + γ2c γ31
>
ri








The various constants γi in this matrix are γ1 = 1/(2H), γ2 =










Performing elementary row reduction on this matrix, then,














Fig. 2. Block diagram of AGC i’s (Gi) attack detection and mitigation
scheme. The attacker’s signal is ei while ∆Pij is the deviation from the
scheduled exchanges between areas i and j.
The coefficient γ9 is guaranteed to be positive because
cA2c>/(2H) is positive and, since A is Hurwitz, the coef-
ficients of its characteristic polynomial are all positive. Since
(c, A) is observable (cf. Section III), we conclude that this
matrix has rank 4 and that the dimension of N(c1,Ai) equals
ni − 4 = ri − 1 as claimed. We can therefore conclude that
Ni = {0}, i.e., (Ci, Ai) is observable, if and only if there are
ri − 1 tie-line measurements. This is precisely condition (ii)
of the proposition statement while condition (i) ensures that
the frequency sensor is measured in the case when the AGC
only has one neighbour.
Corollary V.2. For ri = 1, the maximum number of
sensors which can be attacked when there is no noise and no
disturbances while retaining the ability to estimate the state
of the AGC i equals b(p1 + p2 − 1)/2c.
Proof. Based on Proposition V.1, for any sensor j ∈ Np1+p2
observe that the pair (PjCi, Aid) is observable. Therefore the
pair (PKcCi, A) is observable as long as PKc is not equal to
the zero map, i.e., Kc 6= ∅. This in turn implies that |K| ≤
p1 + p2 − 1. Setting 2qmax = |K| and solving for qmax gives
the desired result.
Before, introducing Corollary V.3, for sake of clarity and
without loss of generality, assume that the tie-line measure-
ments pj+1 are ordered in increasing manner, where p2 ≤
p3 ≤ · · · ≤ pri+1.
Corollary V.3. For ri ≥ 2, the maximum number of sensors
which can be attacked when there is no noise and no distur-
bances while retaining the ability to estimate the state of the
AGC i equals b(p2 + p3 − 1)/2c.
Proof. Based on Proposition V.1, observe that the pair (Ci, Ai)
is observable as long as the number of available tie-line
measurements is at least equal to ri − 1. Therefore the pair
(PKcCi, A) is observable as long as the cardinality of K is
less than p2 + p3. Setting 2qmax = |K| and solving for qmax
gives the desired result.
We now present the attack mitigation strategy for AGC in
multi-area power network. To understand the strategy, note that
each AGC in the network solves it’s own version of Problem 1,
mutatis mutandis, using its own model information. At each
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time step k, the proposed attack mitigation strategy for AGC
i is as follows.
1) Fix N ≥ 3+ri to be the number of steps over which we
aim to detect attacks. The lower bound of 3 + ri comes
from the dimension of the AGC’s state-space.
2) If k ≥ N − 1, solve the mixed integer linear program
Problem 1. Let Ẽ2,0[k] denote the value of the decision
variable returned by the solver.
3) For the redundant measurements, we recursively define
ρ0 := 0, ρj := ρj−1 + pj for j ≥ 1 and then set
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where ẽj [k] is the jth block vector in Ẽ2,0[k]. The ith
component of sj [k] is 1 if we haven not detected an
attack on sensor i over the last N time steps, where
j ∈ {1, ··, ri + 1} . Otherwise the ith component equals
zero.
4) Take the average of the un-attacked sensor readings as
the information available for feedback
yFBi[k] := Myi[k]. (21)












5) Update the discretized PI control signal








where, yFBi,1[k] is the first element in yFBi[k] and
return to Step 2 at the next sample instant.
Of course, for this strategy to be feasible for real-time control
of the AGC i, one must be able to solve Problem 1 within
the scheduling constraints of the embedded controller. The
real-time constraint becomes too restrictive as the number of
neighbours increases. However, we show that for the use of
a fully connected, 3 AGC system, Problem 1 can be solved
in real-time. Most existing interconnected systems [22], [23]
consist of at most three tie lines. This is due to economic and
technical constraints discussed in [24], [25]. Therefore, from a
practical point of view, the proposed algorithm can be applied
to most multi-AGC systems in existence.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present and illustrate the simulation results of the
proposed algorithm compared with legacy AGC in the single
and three-area system. The parameters used in simulation are
given, respectively, in Tables II and III. The parameters are
in per unit on a common 1000 MVA base. We implement
the proposed algorithm in MATLAB and time the execution
of each iteration on a 3.6 GHz i7-7700 CPU. We use CVX
solver (MOSEK) for solving Problem 1. We begin with the
AGC in the single area with sampling period T = 0.1 s. The
number of steps N over which we aim to detect the attack is
equal to 3 for the single AGC case. For simulation purposes,
we consider the following attack signal on sensor i
ei(k) =

a(k − k1r + 1), for, k1r ≤ k ≤ k2r (ramp)
a, for, k1c ≤ k ≤ k2c (constant)
af(k), for, k1p ≤ k ≤ k2p (pulse)
a ∼ N (µ, σ), for, k1k ≤ k ≤ k2k (random)
0 otherwise
(24)
where, f(k), is a pulse wave with a 50% duty cycle and period
6T . The parameters µ, σ are, respectively, the mean and the
standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution. The parameter
a ∈ R controls the “size” of the attack signal. Informally, when
a is small we call the attacks “stealthy”. By small, we mean
that |a| is sufficiently small so as to ensure that the frequency
does not deviate from the safety region and thereby trigger
remedial action
Remark VI.1. We emphasize that our proposed algorithm is
agnostic to the penetration path of the attacker. However, as
pointed out in the introduction, in practice the most attractive
and easiest space for the attacker is the computer network.
Remark VI.2. Our proposed algorithm makes no assumptions
about the particular form of the attack signal. The choices of
the attack made above were done solely for the purpose of
simulation and are partially motivated by the classes of the
attack signals in [2], [8], [9], [10].
The load change ∆PL is generated by scaling the steady
state load by zero-mean Gaussian random variable of standard
deviation 0.05 per unit (p.u.). We assume that the number
of sensors available is equal to 3 (p = 3), so based on
Proposition III.3, qmax is equal to one. Fig. 3 shows the
frequency deviation of the grid in Hz against time (kT ) in
seconds. Fig. 3 shows the frequency deviation of the grid
with and without the proposed algorithm, and compared with
the original frequency deviation. Several kinds of attacks are
applied during the first and the second shaded area to simulate
the unpredictable behaviour of the attacker. For the stealthy
attacks during the first shaded area, ramp, pulse, constant, and
random signal have been initiated at k1r = 40, k
1
p = 150,
k1c = 200, and k
1
k = 250 respectively. The ramp attack with
a = −0.005 lasts for 8.6 seconds (k2r = 125). The pulse
attack with a = −0.2 lasts for 3.6 seconds (k2p = 185). The
constant with a = −0.2, and random with µ = −0.2, σ = 0.1,
attack lasts for 2.6 seconds (k2c = 235, and k
2
k = 285).
When the attacker is applying stealthy attacks (first shaded
area), the frequency goes slightly above the true grid frequency
value. This means that the generation is unnecessarily above
the demand. Consequently, the grid is operated uneconomily,
causing some profit loss to the owner. In the second shaded
area, the ramp attack with a = 0.05 is launched again at 30
seconds (k1r = 300). The aim of this attack is to cause high
deviation from the nominal frequency and trigger the remedial
actions. The thresholds εL and εU shown in Fig. 3 are set to
those for triggering remedial actions. We use εL = −0.5 Hz
and εU = 0.5 Hz [7]. As shown in Fig. 3, the attacker
manipulates the AGC system to make the grid frequency
8
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Fig. 3. The grid frequency deviation where the system is under stealthy attack
(first shaded region) and under severe attack (second shaded region)
TABLE III
SYSTEM PARAMETERS [8]
Area ’i’ D R β Ki H(s) τg(s) τT (s)
Area 1 0.8 0.05 20.8 0.5 5 0.2 0.5
Area 2 0.9 0.0625 16.9 0.5 4 0.3 0.6
Area 3 0.9 0.0625 16.9 0.5 4 0.3 0.6
leave the safety region at time 37.5 s, while the AGC system
equipped with proposed algorithm follows the not attacked
frequency deviation. The proposed algorithm is able to detect
and identify the sensors under attack in 0.07s (i.e., Problem 1
is solved using MOSEK in 0.07 s). The proposed algorithm
is able to detect the attack of size 0.02 Hz (i.e., a = 0.02)
once the attack is launched. Smaller sizes can be detected
after 0.3 to 0.5 second. The proposed algorithm is able to
detect and identify the sensors under attack even in the case of
sudden load change or a high load fluctuation i.e., the proposed
algorithm is able to detect and identify the sensors under attack
when the load change ∆PL is generated by scaling the highly
fluctuated load by zero-mean Gaussian random variable with
a standard deviation of 0.2 p.u.
Next, we test the AGC equipped with the proposed algo-
rithm in a three-area configuration under various types of
coordinated attacks with sampling period T = 0.1 s. The
number of steps N over which we aim to detect the attack
is equal to 5 for the three-AGC case. For each AGC i, we
assume that the number of frequency sensors available is equal
to 3 (p1 = 3), the number of first tie-line sensors available is
equal to 3 (p2 = 3), and the number of second tie-line sensors
available is equal to 4 (p3 = 4). Based on Corollary V.3, the
maximum number of sensor that can be attacked is equal to
3 (qmax = 3), however, simulations suggest that (qmax = 2).
This is due to the presence of noise and load disturbance. The
proposed algorithm is able to detect and identify the tie-line
sensors under attack even in the case of sudden load change or
a high load fluctuation, while frequency sensors under attack
can only be detected during steady-state load conditions.
In our simulation, the attacker misleads AGC 1 by de-
creasing the flow measurement from Area 1 to Area 2 by
0.03 p.u., and Area 1 to Area 3 by 0.03 p.u.. At the same
time, the attacker keeps normal measurements according to
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Fig. 4. Area 1 frequency deviation where the system is under stealthy attack
(first shaded region) and under severe attack (second shaded region)
the scheduled values to AGC in Areas 2 and 3 in order to
prevent corrective action.
For the stealthy attacks during the first shaded area, pulse,
constant, and random signal have been initiated at k1p = 40,
k1c = 80, and k
1
k = 150 respectively. The pulse attack with a =
−0.03 lasts for 3.6 seconds (k2p = 75). The constant with a =
−0.03, last for 6.6 seconds (k2c = 145). The random attacks
with µ = −0.03, and σ = 0.01 last for 2.6 seconds (k2k =
175). In the second shaded area, the ramp attack with a =
−0.01 is launched at 20 s. As shown in Fig. 4, the attack will
cause a remedial action as the frequency goes beyond the safe
region at 24s, while the AGC system equipped with proposed
algorithm follows the not attacked frequency deviation. The
proposed algorithm is able to detect and identify the sensors
under attack in 0.09 s (i.e., Problem 1 is solved in 0.09 s).
The proposed algorithm is able to detect the attack on tie-
line sensors of size 0.01 p.u. (i.e., a = 0.01) once the attack
launched , while for frequency sensors the size is 0.1 Hz (i.e.,
a = 0.1). Smaller sizes can be detected after 0.3 to 0.5 second.
The proposed algorithm was also tested on a system with
twenty states (i.e., eighteen-area AGC system), and is able to
detect and identify the sensors under attack in 0.51 s (i.e.,
Problem 1 is solved using MOSEK in 0.51 s). However, since
most existing multi-area AGC systems are based on three
or two areas, we prefer to demonstrate the above explained
example. We believe that the supercomputer of the power
system operator (PSO) can solve Problem 1 in much faster
time.
Remark VI.3. Simulations, for both the single and mulit-
AGC configurations, were conducted 10,000 times in order
to demonstrate the reliability of the proposed algorithm. The
simulations presented are representative of a typical load
profile.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper developed an efficient algorithm for detecting,
identifying and mitigating cyber-physical attacks for single and
multi-area AGC systems. The proposed algorithm leverages a
MILP-based state estimation procedure introduced in [15], and
adapted for systems with noise in [17]. We provide s-sparse
observability analysis for AGC in single area and multi-area
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power networks. We derived a key formula to compute the
number of sensors needed versus the number of attacks that
can be tolerated. We propose a mitigation procedure based
on simple switching algorithm. Our analysis and algorithms
are validated by simulations for AGC in single and three-
area power network. The proposed algorithm is capable of
providing an accurate detection of attacks and identification
of the sensors under attack even in the case of sudden load
change or high load fluctuation.
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